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Abstract
Empirical work has shown that societies can sometimes avoid antisocial out-
comes, such as the Tragedy of the Commons, by establishing institutional rules
that govern their interactions. Moreover, groups are more likely to avoid anti-
social outcomes when they design and enforce their own rules. But this raises
the question: when will group members put effort into maintaining their in-
stitution so that it continues to provide socially beneficial outcomes? Ostrom
derived a set of empirical principles that predict when institutions will endure,
which have subsequently been formalised in agent-based models that are based
on an executable description of the content of an individual’s behaviour. Here
we show how these models can be complemented by evolutionary game theory,
which focuses on the value or payoff of different behaviours, rather than on
the mechanistic content of the behaviour. Using such a value-based model, we
determine exactly when individuals will be incentivised to maintain their insti-
tution and enforce its rules, including the critical amount that a group must
invest into incentivising agents to monitor rule compliance. We highlight the
complementarity of content-based and value-based modelling approaches, and
therefore provide a step towards unifying theoretical and empirical approaches
to understanding enduring institutions and other social phenomena.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation can be defined as a behaviour that provides a benefit to other
individuals, i.e. increases the social welfare of the group. Under the assumption
of self-interested behaviour, micro-economic theory demonstrates that if agents
are to cooperate, then there needs to be the provision of individual incentives
for them to do so (Oliver, 1980; Olson, 1965). Increasing social welfare in and of
itself is not sufficient; individuals must gain more from cooperating than from
defecting. Left unchecked, this leads to the phenomenon known as the Tragedy
of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), in which antisocial outcomes pervade, such
as the depletion of common-pool resources. This result has been the prevail-
ing starting point for many socio-economic policy decisions, as well as many
distributed computing design decisions, for several decades.
However, the conclusions of the Tragedy of the Commons rest on the as-
sumption that individuals are playing a particular game form, corresponding to
an n-player version of the single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ostrom, 1990). In
reality, individuals typically have the potential to change the rules of their social
interactions (North, 1990; Reiter, 1996), by reasoning through the situation in
which they find themselves. In economics, an institution is defined as a family
of game forms (strategies and the mappings between strategies and material
outcomes) that individuals can choose between, given the state of the physi-
cal environment (e.g. their resource endowments) and their current technology
(Hurwicz, 1996). More informally, we can think of a game form as the “rules of
the game”, and hence of individuals as being able to choose the rules of their
game by creating an institution.
There are many empirical examples of societies being able to avoid anti-social
outcomes by devising institutional rules that govern their interactions in the use
of common-pool resources such as grazing lands, fisheries, and irrigation systems
(e.g. Ostrom, 1990). Example rules include how much water an individual may
take from a shared irrigation system, when they may take it, how often they
must perform maintenance, etc. Furthermore, the empirical work suggests that
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these rules are self-enforcing (Greif, 2006), in the sense that it pays both for
individuals to follow them, and to take actions that encourage others to follow
them.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the creation of these rules changes the game
form into one where self-interested individuals do best by cooperating (Greif,
2006; Hurwicz, 1996; North, 1990). The Folk Theorem of game theory explains
why this can work (Binmore, 2014): when interactions are repeated, cooperation
can be sustained as an equilibrium by conditional strategies that respond to the
past behaviour of other agents. One example of such a strategy is Tit-for-
Tat (Axelrod, 1984): cooperate on the first round, and thereafter mirror what
the other agent did on the previous round. But this is just one example. In
general, the Folk Theorem shows that any strategy that gives an agent more than
the minimax payoff can be sustained as an equilibrium amongst self-interested
agents. The minimax payoff is the largest payoff that an agent can receive if its
opponent tries to minimise the agent’s payoff, which in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
corresponds to the payoff received when the opponent defects. Therefore, any
strategy that gives the agent a higher payoff than always being defected against
will be an equilibrium when adopted by all of the agents, since if the agent
deviated from this strategy then it could have its payoff reduced to the minimax
payoff by its co-players. Importantly, this result also holds where N agents
interact simultaneously (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986), e.g. in the management
of common-pool resources.
However, cooperation between self-interested agents under the Folk Theorem
requires that the agents value future payoffs, do not know when their interac-
tions will end, and have sufficient information about how other agents have
behaved in the past. By creating institutional rules, individuals can create a
social environment that satisfies these conditions (Guala, 2012), e.g. by setting
up systems of monitoring (Ostrom, 1990), facilitating the spread of reputation
(Hardy & Norgaard, 2015; Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1990), and decreasing
the outside options of the agents so that they do indeed value future payoffs and
do not know when their interactions will end (Casari, 2007). Furthermore, the
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creation of institutional rules helps agents to coordinate their behaviour onto
one of the many possible equilibria, by creating shared expectations about how
other agents will behave (Greif, 2006).
Creating, updating and implementing these institutional rules requires time
and effort. Without this they are likely to collapse and individuals will revert
back to the default game form where cooperation is not favoured. Ostrom’s
field studies suggest that institutions are more likely to endure and maintain
socially beneficial outcomes in the long term when the institutional rules are
both created and implemented by the same agents whose economic interactions
are affected by those rules. This then raises the question: under what conditions
will self-interested agents be willing to put the effort into doing this, by taking
on various institutional roles? Examples of institutional roles include acting as
a monitor to check for rule compliance, or organising votes on rule changes.
We cannot predict whether institutions will endure in the long term without
examining the incentives for agents to take on institutional roles.
In order to examine the conditions under which institutions can endure and
maintain cooperation, researchers have recently formalised Ostrom’s principles
of enduring institutions using agent-based models (e.g. Pitt, Schaumeier & Ar-
tikis, 2012; Smajgl, Izquierdo & Huigen, 2008, 2010). Agent-based modelling
provides a highly effective method with which to conduct experimental studies
on the consequences of different assumptions about behaviour (Di Paolo, Noble
& Bullock, 2000); in the humanities and social sciences, they have been referred
to as digital Petri dishes (Gavin, 2014). Agent-based modelling is a highly at-
tractive approach, primarily due to its ability to capture complex behaviours and
interactions in executable form, and to explore emergent phenomena simply by
“running” variants of the model (Bonabeau, 2002; Epstein & Axtell, 1996). This
is particularly helpful when building intuition or illustrating counter-examples.
However, due to the complexity of the formal description required, there is also
a limit to its explanatory power. This is particularly true when answering ques-
tions related to incentivisation and critical values of parameters in a rigorous
way.
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As an alternative, evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) is a
more descriptive modelling technique first established in theoretical biology to
study the evolution of adaptive traits in populations of animals. It has since
been applied in economics, sociology, anthropology, and elsewhere in biology,
and is used to explore both genetic and cultural evolution.
In this paper, we explore how agent-based models, based on executing the
content of strategies, can be complemented by evolutionary game theory, where
a description of the value of strategies instead forms the basis. This allows us to
draw on existing results and understanding from the evolutionary game theory
literature, in order to provide additional insight. Specifically, we provide new
analytical insight into the effects of different ways of incentivising agents to take
on an institutional monitoring role, and on the optimal proportion of a group’s
resources that they should invest into monitoring.
The discussion and results in this paper therefore provide a step towards
unifying theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding the formation
of enduring institutions. Further, we anticipate that this will readily aid research
into other questions of social and cultural nature.
2. The Complementarity of Content-based and Value-based Models
Both agent-based modelling (ABM) and evolutionary game theory (EGT)
are well-established approaches to modelling social systems, especially for an-
swering questions relating to population-level results arising from interactions
between individuals with (potentially varying) behavioural strategies. We char-
acterise these as instances of content-based and value-based modelling approaches,
respectively, and in this section, explore their complementarity in general. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates this.
2.1. What do ABM and EGT capture and what do they assume?
Game theory defines a strategy as a mapping from environmental context














Figure 1: A sketch of a taxonomy of approaches for modelling systems of social interactions.
The primary distinction made in this paper is between approaches that capture the value of
different strategies, and those that capture the content of those strategies. A range of game
theory variants, including EGT, can then be seen as value-based approaches. ABM, and other
forms of executable simulation modelling, instead model the content of agent strategies. This
can be implemented programatically in different ways, as shown in the right-hand side of the
figure.
behaviour, as its environment (including the behaviour of other agents) changes.
This is equivalent to the notion of Russell and Norvig’s agent function (Russell
& Norvig, 2010) in artificial intelligence: the mathematical object that maps
a given percept sequence to an action, and is made explicit through an agent
program. In ABM, many such agents are instantiated. Each agent’s program
is executed and is responsible for maintaining its own state over time. The
environment is also modelled with a state that may be changed over time, both
as a result of agent actions, or by a program that captures natural forces.
By contrast, in EGT, an explicit description of the content of a behaviour and
its impact on the environment is not given. Instead, strategies are considered
as traits that may be more or less prevalent in a population (which is typically
assumed to be infinite and well-mixed), and compete with each other in an
evolutionary sense. The task is then to write equations that describe the fitness
(i.e., evolutionary value) of a strategy, given the current frequency of each of all
possible strategies in the population. The dynamics of strategy frequency are
then explored, under the assumption that the change in strategy frequency is
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correlated with the fitness of the strategy.
A key distinction, therefore, can be made in terms of what is captured and
what is assumed in each case. In EGT the existence of a space of possible
behaviours and their expected fitness is presented in a descriptive (equation-
based) form. However, the content of the actions themselves that form part of
the strategy, and lead to this fitness, are omitted. This omission includes any
deliberative or developmental processes that are assumed to be included in the
execution of the strategy; only the value of any such activity, in terms of its
fitness, is given.
By contrast, in ABM a description of the content of the modelled actions
is provided, typically in imperative or logical form, along with what effect they
have on the world and other agents. Thus, it is possible to capture a deep and
complex set of behaviours in an agent, based (for example) on learning, deliber-
ative, and other cognitive processes. However, there is no explicit description of
the value of carrying out the described activities, and furthermore, such a value
is hard to arrive at, save by executing the agent programs and observing.
In summary, ABM and EGT each leave implicit what is made explicit in the
other. ABM can capture rich behaviours, but struggles to support an analysis
of their value. Conversely, EGT provides the necessary primitives to analyse the
incentives and outcomes associated with different behaviours in a rigorous way,
yet in doing so lacks the ability to capture what may be crucial details of the
nature of the strategies themselves, and assumes that any value is accurately
defined.
2.2. Producing a Justifiable Model
In ABM, model justification is usually done through calibration against ob-
served phenomena (Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). First, one observes and captures
micro-level behaviours (i.e., the behaviour of a single agent in a specific con-
text), producing an agent program that replicates that behaviour. Second, one
then observes macro-level behaviour for already well-observed phenomena, and
the model is calibrated to ensure that observed emergent (global) outcomes are
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reproduced. Additional macro-level outcomes are then reported as predictions
of the model.
As discussed in Section 2.1, to produce an EGT model, it is required that the
modeller is able to arrive at the evolutionary ‘value’ of each possible strategy,
in a way that justifiably drives strategy frequency. Such a justification is often
plausible: in animal population studies, it is possible to identify which traits are
correlated with greater numbers of successful offspring, and traits are assumed
to be heritable; in economics, firms are more likely to copy the traits embodied
by financially successful firms than those of bankrupt ones. However, in more
complex social systems where growth in frequency of a strategy is likely to be
strongly determined by human cognitive aspects, and not primarily driven by
the copying of behaviour, we must be careful to ensure that the definition of
evolutionary value in the model is justified.
2.3. Performing Analysis with ABM and EGT
The primary method of interrogation of ABMs is through experimentation
on the effects of varying different parameters and behavioural rules. Thus, hav-
ing expressed a set of executable behaviours, one needs to take an inductive
scientific approach to arriving at claims. One varies parameters of the model
(often both those within individual behaviours, as well as those concerning the
world), and one can explore, in a black-box way, the outcomes the system pro-
duces. Typically, a full factorial or similar approach is taken, in order to build
confidence in claims relating to the effect of varying each parameter.
In EGT, there is no requirement to execute the model, although the equa-
tions that form the model are often solved numerically through a computer
program, in addition to being analysed in the classic sense. With EGT mod-
els, one is primarily looking for relationships and critical values that can be
deduced by solving the equations algebraically. Numerical simulation is often
used to validate or to solve these where tractability becomes an issue.
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2.4. The Complementarity of ABM and EGT
As it is hopefully clear from the above discussion, neither ABM nor EGT
is able to replace the other in terms of supporting the full breadth of analysis
forms that the other provides; both bring something to the table for the modeller
of social systems. Similarly to how, in software engineering, different language
styles, e.g., imperative or functional, are used for different purposes, in the
modelling of social systems, different modelling approaches are better suited to
address different questions.
One significant benefit of content-based approaches like ABM is the abil-
ity to make the specification of the model its own execution. A further ben-
efit is that it is often easier to discern and model the content of an agent’s
behaviour, rather than the value of that behaviour, and to capture this in a
model. Deriving a payoff matrix from empirical observations can be difficult
(although this has been done quantitatively in some studies, e.g. Gore, Youk &
van Oudenaarden, 2009). Content-based approaches therefore lend themselves
more to empirical study, exploring the outcome of observed behaviour. This
can be achieved without the need to concern oneself with details of a method of
analysis or solving the model, beyond running and interrogating a simulation.
Content-based approaches vary in how they approach the description of agent
behaviours. When using an imperative language (e.g., Lewis & Ekárt (2017)
used Java), the solving is embedded in the description of the system itself. Al-
ternatively, computational logic (e.g., Pitt et al. (2012) used Prolog) may be
used to separate behaviour specification from behaviour execution, the latter
being carried out through query resolution. Value-based approaches share this
separation of concerns. However, the key benefit in the value-based case is that
the description is already a statement that quantifies the outcome of carrying
out a given behaviour. Therefore, critical parameters affecting the outcome
are more readily accessible and they no longer need to be induced from the
execution. Much of the rest of this paper, especially Section 5, is devoted to
illustrating this benefit in the domain of institutional modelling.
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2.5. Existing cross-fertilisation between Evolutionary Game Theory and Agent-
Based Modelling
ABM and EGT have been successfully used to feed into each other. One of
the first examples was Axelrod’s tournament, where researchers were invited to
submit different agent programs to play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
(Axelrod, 1984). This allowed Axelrod to empirically explore the space of dif-
ferent possible strategies, and their behavioural interactions with each other,
rather than having to presuppose a fixed number in a model. However, analysis
of the winning Tit-for-Tat strategy, in terms of the conditions under which it was
stable and the conditions under which it could become established in a group,
was eased by using a value-based evolutionary game theory approach (Axelrod
& Hamilton, 1981). More recently, a similar tournament where researchers sub-
mitted agent programs containing different social learning strategies allowed the
traditional assumptions of value-based models of social learning to be relaxed.
This produced new insights that have in turn fed back into more descriptive
value-based models of social learning (Rendell, Fogarty, Hoppitt, Morgan, Web-
ster & Laland, 2011).
More generally, content-based ABMs have been used to expand results from
EGT by relaxing assumptions such as only a small number of mutations being
present at one time, and no communication between players (Adami, Schossau
& Hintze, 2016). Going the other way, value-based models have provided in-
sight into when individual strategies that punish non-cooperative behaviour can
actually be stable (Lehmann, Rousset, Roze & Keller, 2007) that were difficult
to achieve in simulation (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles & Richerson, 2003). In the re-
mainder of this paper we examine how similar cross-fertilisation can benefit the
study of institutions.
3. Institutions for Managing Common-pool Resources
Many individual behaviours are needed to sustain an institution. These in-
clude designing the rules, voting on them, monitoring the behaviour of group
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members, and sanctioning those found breaking the rules. It has been shown
that if we abstract away from how these behaviours are carried out then institu-
tions can both lead to stable cooperation (Pitt et al., 2012; Sasaki, Brännström,
Dieckmann & Sigmund, 2012), and evolve de novo (Powers & Lehmann (2013)).
In these models institutional roles, such as designing rules or monitoring rule
compliance, are contracted out – it is assumed that some individuals will faith-
fully carry out these roles without shirking or free-riding. But to understand
when institutions will be sustainable, we need to understand under what condi-
tions it pays individuals to perform these roles. While many micro-level models
of monitoring and sanctioning have been produced using classical and evolution-
ary game theory, these have not considered the context of institutional roles.
How do evolving institutional rules affect individual incentives to monitor and
sanction? In this study, we analyse different incentivisation mechanisms from
both ABM and EGT perspectives.
3.1. Common-Pool Resource Allocation and the Tragedy of the Commons
A common-pool resource (CPR) is defined by Ostrom (1990, p.30) as “a nat-
ural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly
(but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits
from its use”. Examples of such resource systems could be fisheries, various
water resources ranging from groundwater basins to lakes and oceans, irrigation
systems, bridges, and computer clusters. We study resource systems used by
multiple individuals, who can appropriate or use resource units, such as tons
of fish harvested from a fishery, cubic meters of water withdrawn from a water
resource, number of crossings of a bridge, central processing units consumed on
a cluster computer.
In a game-theoretic formulation of the common-pool resource allocation
problem, at each time step, given the allocation of resource units to individu-
als, each individual can decide to comply and appropriate the allocated amount
(cooperate) or not comply and appropriate the amount they wish (defect).
The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) is defined as the inevitable
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consequence of rational, self-interested individuals appropriating any number of
resource units that they wish. Over time, as the individuals see the benefits of
their own appropriations, they will increase their appropriations. The common-
pool resource is expected to degrade and become depleted over time, due to the
uncontrolled appropriations from the limited resource.
Historically, attempts to avoid the Tragedy of the Commons have involved
centralisation or privatisation. With centralisation, an imposed institution
would control the allocation of resource units to appropriators, monitor com-
pliance and sanction non-compliance. In the case of privatisation, the resource
is divided among individuals and they then become responsible for their share.
Based on studies of small, closed CPR instances, such as fisheries, Ostrom pi-
oneered new forms of institutions, where once the institution is in place, the
individuals would self-organise and self-govern their resource in a way that pre-
vents the Tragedy of the Commons from occurring.
3.2. Ostrom’s principles for enduring institutions
Ostrom (1990) has extensively studied the governance of long-enduring, self-
organised and self-governed CPRs, including fisheries, water irrigation systems
and forests, some as old as 1000 years. The main studied aspects were the
problems of commitment and mutual monitoring.
From this empirical study Ostrom derived eight principles for the design of
long-enduring institutions:
1. Clearly defined boundaries: As a first step in organising for collective ac-
tion, both the individuals who have the right to appropriate resource units
from the CPR and the boundaries of the CPR must be clearly defined.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local condi-
tions: Having rules for appropriation and provision specific to the local
conditions of the particular resource contributes to the endurance of CPRs.
For example, in the Spanish huertas, substantially different rules must be
applied in different regions for water irrigation, depending on local speci-
ficity, even though the water management problem is broadly similar.
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3. Collective-choice arrangements: Appropriators can participate in the de-
sign of the institution by tailoring the rules over time. It must be noted
that appropriators will not necessarily comply with good operational rules,
when these exist, even if they took part in their design. Furthermore, even
when reputation is important and individuals share the norm of honouring
agreements, these are insufficient by themselves to ensure stable coopera-
tion in the long term.
4. Monitoring: Monitors, who audit both state condition and appropria-
tion behaviour, are part of or accountable to the appropriators. The cost
of monitoring in long-enduring CPRs is often low. For example, in an
irrigation system using a rotation appropriation rule, monitoring is a by-
product: the individual nearing the end of their turn might wish to extend
their turn, while the next individual ready to start their turn might wish
to start earlier. They thus mutually monitor each other and ensure com-
pliance with the rule by both.
5. Graduated sanctions: Appropriators, who do not respect community rules,
are applied sanctions dependent on the seriousness of their offence, by
appropriators or assigned officials accountable to appropriators, or both.
The graduated sanctions will have to work hand-in-hand with monitoring
to ensure sufficient level of rule-following and avoid increase in infractions.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: There must exist cheap and easily acces-
sible mechanisms to resolve conflicts between appropriators and officials
or among appropriators. Although this by itself does not ensure enduring
institutions, the maintenance of complex rule systems over time is helped
by it.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize: External governmental officials
do not challenge the right of appropriators to devise their own institutions.
For example, in a fishery, local fishers can devise the rules determining
who can use the fishing ground and with what equipment, without their
authority being challenged by external governmental officials.
8. Nested enterprises: In the case of larger CPRs, organisation of all activities
13
is in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small, local
CPRs at their bases.
Ostrom predicts that where these eight principles are satisfied institutions
will be maintained and will continue to prevent over-exploitation of common-
pool resources over a long time horizon.
3.3. Agent-based modelling of enduring institutions
In this section, we examine how Ostrom’s empirical principles for enduring
institutions have been formalised using ABM. Formalisation is necessary both to
gain a deeper understanding of the conditions under which they are effective, and
to allow their implementation in socio-technical systems that contain artificial
as well as human agents. We highlight three studies contributing to the agent-
based modelling of enduring institutions, starting from formal axiomatisation
(Pitt et al., 2012) and continuing with the relationship between institutional
features and forms of learning (Lewis & Ekárt, 2017) and relaxation of norms
for sustainable institutions (Kurka & Pitt, 2017).
Pitt et al. (2012) develop a formal axiomatisation of Ostrom’s first six prin-
ciples for CPR in Event Calculus. They implement an executable test-bed and
show that these principles support enduring institutions. They build gradually
more complex and realistic tests for the principles. They find that when the
agents comply with the rules for appropriation, the first three principles are
sufficient for the institution to endure.1 When the assumptions on compliance
are relaxed, this is not the case any more and the next three principles become
necessary. In their setting, these six principles ensure enduring institutions
with high membership and resource sustainability. Thus, with this work, they
establish the feasibility of an institution-based approach to dynamic resource
allocation, specifically when long-term endurance is sought.
Lewis & Ekárt (2017) focus on the interplay between institutional features
and forms of learning used by agents. They show that the way the agents learn
1Their experiments consider a lifespan of 500 time steps.
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influences directly the existence and sustainability of the institution, and at
the same time, the institution’s features can either tolerate or inhibit learning.
Institutional pardons in the sanctioning mechanism (Ostrom’s principle 5) have
a key role, as they allow for tolerance of behaviours associated with ongoing
learning, such as complacency and exploration.
Kurka & Pitt (2017) study the relaxation of norms, in particular of sanc-
tioning strategies for non-compliance in socio-technical systems, in a scenario
where monitoring comes at a cost and also subjective and diverse behaviour
of agents can be expected. They define principled violation of policy as “the
active and intentional decision of an agent of not applying a policy to which
it is entitled” (i.e. a sanction). They demonstrate via a series of experiments
on CPR allocation that strategies of partially applying sanctions lead to more
cost-effective solutions, that are flexible to different scenarios and behaviour.
So, ABM shows how both institutional pardons and partial sanction applica-
tion are mechanisms that can lead to more sustainable institutions. But how can
agents be incentivised to take on the roles that lead to sustainable institutions
(such as monitoring behaviour or organising votes to change the rules)?
4. The Challenge of Predicting Conditions for Establishment and Sus-
tenance of Cooperation-Promoting Institutions
Having established the complementarity of value-based and content-based
models in general, and EGT and ABM in particular, in Section 2, our aim is
to establish the value of each approach in understanding and controlling the
behaviour of agents forming an institution to resolve common-pool resource
allocation problems. The role of ABM has already been well demonstrated in
prior work (as discussed already in this section), therefore, in the remainder of
this paper we focus on illustrating additional insight that can be obtained by
taking a value-based, EGT approach.
Using EGT, we focus on the challenge of predicting conditions for the for-
mation and sustenance of cooperation-promoting institutions, when individual
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agents have to be incentivised to take on the institutional roles that are neces-
sary for this. These predictions would be difficult to make from an agent-based
model, other than by interrogating it rather laboriously in a black-box fash-
ion. Here we aim to derive relations between parameters in order to answer the
following questions:
1. How many agents need to take on a monitoring role in order to incentivise
cooperation?
2. What level of investment into monitoring is necessary to incentivise this
number of agents to become monitors?
3. What are the conditions for cooperation to become established given an
initial state where no agent cooperates and no agent monitors?
5. Illustrating the Role and Benefits of Value-based Models
To illustrate the role and benefits of value-based models, we consider under
what conditions agents can be incentivised to monitor each other’s compliance
with institutional rules. Previous work has recognised that monitoring rule
compliance is necessarily costly. Monitoring can carry both physical costs, e.g.,
energy or CPU cycles, and opportunity costs where the time spent on moni-
toring is time lost carrying out other productive activities. This is true both
in natural systems, such as irrigation systems (Weissing & Ostrom, 2000) and
fisheries, and artificial systems such as community clouds (Khan, Freitag & Ro-
drigues, 2015) or community co-production energy systems (Torrent-Fontbona,
López, Busquets & Pitt, 2016). Therefore, if self-interested agents are to be
incentivised to monitor rule compliance then they need to be reimbursed for
this cost somehow.
One empirically grounded way in which the costs of monitoring can be re-
imbursed is by using a fraction of the group’s common-pool resource to pay
for monitoring. This fraction of the resource invested into monitoring is an in-
stitutional fact, i.e., it is determined by the current institutional rules. Several
models have examined the effect of different levels of investment into monitoring
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at an abstract level (Balke, De Vos & Padget, 2013; Jaffe & Zaballa, 2010; Pitt
& Schaumeier, 2012; Powers, 2018; Powers & Lehmann, 2013), by assuming that
the probability that an agent is monitored for rule compliance is proportional
to the amount of resource invested into monitoring. But these models did not
examine what would happen if agents have to choose whether or not they will
take on the monitoring role, and how the level of monitoring will consequently
evolve over time. Here we take this theoretical work further by developing a
micro-level model that considers agents explicitly choosing whether or not to
take on a monitoring role when they must pay a cost for doing so.
In the following sections we develop a general descriptive model and then
consider several variants in which monitoring is incentivised in different ways.
5.1. Base Model
We consider a model in which n agents take part in a linear public goods
game to provision a common-pool resource. Each agent makes three decisions: i)
whether or not to cooperate by provisioning the common pool at a cost to itself;
ii) whether or not to pay a tax to support implementation of the institution; and
iii) whether or not to monitor other agents to determine if they have contributed.
Agents that both did not provision to the common pool and were monitored
(thus caught) are sanctioned, creating a cost to free-riding (CF).
Provisioning the common- pool resource, as well as taking on the monitoring
role, carries some cost to the agent (CC and CM, respectively). Monitors are
reimbursed for their work according to two different schemes that we compare
and contrast below. The process is then repeated for a number of rounds T .
Thus, the utility of an individual agent will be built up from a base utility,
the individual’s share of the common-pool resource, the individual’s cost if they
contribute to the common-pool, the individual’s cost if instead they free-ride,
the individual’s net benefit if they take on a monitoring role, and the individual’s
cost of paying a tax to support the institution (Cτ ).
More formally, the utility of agent i at round t is given explicitly by the
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following function:
ui(t) = u0 +BG(t)− ιiCCC − (1− ιiC)CF(t) + ιiM[BM(t)− CM]− ιiτCτ , (1)
where ιiC, ιiM and ιiτ are indicator variables that take the value 1 if the agent
contributes to the common pool, monitors, and pays tax to support the insti-
tution, respectively, and 0 otherwise. In this utility function, u0 is a baseline
utility in the absence of social interactions. The term BG(t) represents the





where nC(t) is the number of agents that provisioned the common resource on
round t (the number of agents with ιC = 1) and α is a model parameter repre-
senting the amount of resource that each agent provides when they provision.
The parameter CC represents the cost to the agent of provisioning α units of
common-pool resource. Following the definition of a linear public goods game,
we assume that CC < α, i.e. there is a benefit to agents of cooperating together
to share their resources.
The term CF(t) represents the cost of free-riding, i.e. of an agent not provi-
sioning the common pool. This cost is paid by all agents with ιC = 0. 2 The
cost is calculated as the probability than an agent is monitored, multiplied by





where nM(t) is the number of agents that take on the monitoring role at round t,
i.e. the number of agents with ιM = 1, and p is the number of agents monitored
by each monitor. We assume that each monitor monitors a different, non-
overlapping, set of agents, and that an agent is not monitored more than once.
This corresponds to an assumption that agents have the technology to perfectly
coordinate their monitoring.
2In the remainder of the paper we do not use the i index, as it would not affect the analysis
and makes the formulas easier to read.
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The term BM(t) represents the amount that monitors are reimbursed for
their monitoring work. We examine different ways in which monitoring can be
paid for, and hence different expressions for BM(t), in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
The term CM represents the cost to agent i of monitoring other agents. The
cost of monitoring a single agent is δ, so the total cost to an agent of monitoring
on one round is
CM = pδ. (4)
Finally, the parameter Cτ represents the tax paid each round to support
implementation of the institutional arrangements, which is paid by all agents
with ιτ = 1.
The costs of monitoring, contributing to the common pool, and paying tax
to support implementation of the institutional arrangements are constant ev-
ery round, depending only on model parameters. By contrast, the individual’s
share of the common-pool resource, the benefit of monitoring, and the cost of
free-riding are dynamic variables that depend on the values of the model state
variables nC(t), nM(t) and nτ (t) during that round.
We are interested in the conditions under which agents will create a system of
monitoring that incentivises cooperation, i.e. that makes the cost of provisioning
less than the cost of freeriding (CC < CF(t)). To determine this, we consider
the evolution of the three agent behavioural traits ιC, ιM, and ιτ when agents
with those traits are in competition with each other (Maynard Smith, 1982).
An EGT analysis considers that there are eight possible types of agents
depending on the values of their ι traits, and tracks the frequency of each type
in the population. All agents with the same type are assumed to have the same
utility. Specifically, we take an agent type’s utility in round t from Equation 1
as the fitness of that type of agent in generation t, i.e. one round corresponds to
one generation. The frequency of an agent type in the next generation is then
proportional to its fitness (i.e. fitness proportionate selection), as described by
the standard replicator equation (see, e.g. Maynard Smith, 1982).
However, direct analysis by means of the replicator equation is complicated
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because of the large number of types, and the possible effects of covariance be-
tween the different traits. To ease analysis, we therefore consider each trait
independently, asking when an agent will gain fitness by switching the corre-
sponding ι value from 0 to 1 (or vice versa).
Importantly, an EGT analysis does not assume genetic transmission of traits.
Rather, it can be used to capture social learning where agents imitate the traits
of other agents, and are more likely to imitate traits that they observe to bring a
higher payoff – so-called payoff-biased social learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1985;
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). We proceed by analysing the above equations
to determine inequalities capturing the conditions under which provisioning is
favoured (i.e. individuals evolve an ιC value of 1).
5.2. Variant 1: Individuals make a unilateral decision about whether to con-
tribute to a separate pool of monitoring fees
In the first variant of the model, monitors take their payment from the






where β is the proportion of institutional taxes that are invested into monitoring
and nτ is the number of agents that pay the institutional taxes (i.e that have
ιτ = 1).
This model represents each agent making a unilateral decision about whether
to make a separate contribution to sustain implementation of the institutional
rules or not, in a manner similar to pool punishment models studied in evolu-
tionary biology (Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen & Hauert, 2010; Sigmund, Hauert,
Traulsen & Silva, 2011; Traulsen, Röhl & Milinski, 2012).
3For the purpose of analysis, we do not use the time step in the remainder of the paper.
As we are not interested in the evolution over time, but the analysis at a given moment in
time, this makes the expressions easier to read.
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The first question that we can ask from our value-based EGT model is:
when does it pay an agent to cooperate, i.e. when will the fitness (utility) of an
agent be greater if they cooperate than if they do not? In other words, when is
cooperation incentivised, such that agents with ιC = 1 outcompete agents with
ιC = 0? Cooperation will be incentivised when the cost of cooperating is less
than the cost of free-riding, i.e. CC < CF. This occurs when CC < psnMn , which







We can see from this that increasing CC will increase the number of monitors
that are necessary to incentivise cooperation, while increasing either the number
of agents that each monitor monitors for rule compliance (p) or the sanction
imposed on a free-riding agent when they are monitored (s) will decrease the
number of monitors that are necessary. As such, the value-based model makes
clear and precise predictions about the amount of monitoring that is necessary.
This is in contrast to executable content-based models of institutions (e.g. Pitt
& Schaumeier, 2012), where large numbers of experiments have to be run to
attempt to derive such inequalities by brute force numeric searching of the
effects of model parameter values.
The next question that is important to ask is: when will this level of mon-
itoring be sufficiently incentivised, such that it individually pays all of these
agents (nM) to take on the monitoring role? Performing monitoring will be
advantageous for an agent when BM > CM, that is when βnτCτnM > pδ. We can
rearrange this to highlight the relationship between the frequency of tax payers









This means that, to incentivise monitoring, the frequency of tax payers mul-
tiplied by the amount βCτpδ needs to be greater than the frequency of monitors.
If this amount is less than 1 – assuming that all of the agents are self-interested –
then not every tax payer can be a monitor. Although there are possibilities to
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make this amount larger than 1 (i.e. by setting Cτ to a large value or having a
low cost of monitoring δ), we are most interested in the case when this is less
than 1, because then there is a decision to be made, whether to monitor or not.
As inequalities 6 and 7 are both expressed in terms of the proportion of agents

















So, the ratio of the monitoring cost (δ) to the sanction for free-riding (s) needs to
be less than the ratio of one agent’s share of the monitoring pool tax ( 1nβnτCτ )
to the cost of cooperation (CC). Of these, s, β and Cτ are likely to be at least
partly under the control of the agents themselves, i.e. they are institutional
facts. Choosing values for these accordingly ensures that it pays for nM agents
to do monitoring.
Finally, we need to examine the incentives to pay the institutional taxes,
which in turn pay for some agents to monitor by providing βCτ units of resource
for monitoring. Exactly as for our analysis for the traits ιC and ιM, for tax
paying to be incentivised, the cost of the tax needs to be less than the benefit
to the individual agent of paying the tax. But we can see from Equation 1 that
there is no individual benefit to paying the tax, i.e. there is no Bτ term. The
benefits of paying tax are manifest through their use in incentivising monitoring
and hence cooperation. But these benefits are shared equally with all of the
agents, since the common-pool resource that is provisioned through cooperation
is shared equally by all agents (Equation 2). Therefore, in this model self-
interested agents will not pay institutional taxes, which means that there will
be no resources invested into monitoring, and hence self-interested agents will
not monitor. Then, in the absence of monitoring self-interested agents will not
cooperate. In other words, monitoring itself becomes subject to a second-order
tragedy of the commons (Axelrod, 1986; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fowler, 2005;
Perc, 2012).
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This problem is clearly highlighted by the equations of this model, since it
is specified in terms of the value of each strategy. This shows that monitoring
cannot be favoured for any set of parameters. Relying solely instead on a model
that captured the content of behaviours, and not their value, would mean that
an exhaustive search of parameter settings would need to be carried out in order
to be sure that the lack of monitoring and cooperation was not an artefact of
the particular parameter values chosen.
We now turn to investigate other ways in which monitoring can be incen-
tivised.
5.3. Variant 2: Monitoring is paid for from the common-pool resource
In this variant, monitors take their payment directly from the common-pool
resource according to a parameter β, which represents the proportion of the
group’s common-pool resource that is invested into monitoring. This is an in-
stitutional fact, i.e. part of the institutional rules. It corresponds more closely
to several of the empirical examples given by Ostrom (1990), where agents use
their common resources to either hire monitors that are accountable to them-
selves, or to reward certain group members for taking on the monitoring role.
This involves agents making a collective decision about how much their group
invests into monitoring (Conradt & List, 2009; Conradt & Roper, 2003), in con-
trast to the unilateral decision in Variant 1 of the model. In other words, agents
play a political game in which they bargain and negotiate over the institutional
rules and how to enforce them (Hurwicz, 1996; Reiter, 1996). This political
game would result in setting the value of β in our model. The evolutionary
dynamics of individual agent preferences for the value of β have been studied
elsewhere (Powers, 2018; Powers & Lehmann, 2013). Here we do not consider
the dynamics of exactly how β is set by a political game, but we instead focus
on the effects of β on the level of monitoring that is incentivised.
In Variant 2 of the model, Cτ is set to 0, since monitoring is now paid for
from the common-pool resource. This means that we no longer have to consider
the evolution of ιτ (it is a neutral trait). Since a fraction β of the common-
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pool resource is now used to pay for monitoring, the remaining fraction 1−β is
distributed amongst all of the agents. Thus Equation 2 becomes:
BG(t) = (1− β) 1
n
× αnC(t) (9)





The inequality for cooperation to be favoured remains the same as in Vari-
ant 1, i.e. nMn >
Cc
ps . Monitoring, however, will now be incentivised when
αβnC
nM
> pδ. Rearrangement of this highlights the relationship between the fre-
quency of monitors and the frequency of cooperation that is necessary to provide









From this we can draw out the roles of the parameters α, β, p and δ.
For full cooperation (i.e. every agent cooperates) to be an equilibrium, the
largest frequency of monitors for which monitoring is individually incentivised
in (11) needs to be greater than the frequency of monitors that is necessary to
sustain full cooperation. This means that the following condition must hold,
















The parameter p, the number of agents monitored by each monitor, appears on
the denominator of both sides and so cancels out. This is a result of the assump-
tion that monitors sample agents to monitor without replacement (Equation 3),
and so doubling p means that half as many monitors are needed to sample the
same number of agents.
When the relationship among the parameters in (13) holds then full coop-
eration will be an equilibrium. At this equilibrium, monitoring will go to the
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maximum frequency at which it is incentivised, which is when nMn =
αβ
pδ (sub-
ject to the constraint that nMn cannot exceed 1). When αβ < pδ then this
will be less than 1, and so selection on ιM will depend on the frequency of
monitoring already in the population, leading to an interior equilibrium for the
frequency of monitoring. Conversely, when αβ ≥ pδ and (13) hold then there
is an equilibrium in which every agent cooperates and every agent monitors.
From (11) it follows that if αβ < pδ then monitoring and cooperation cannot
be linked (or the same) traits, since the number of incentivised monitors is less
than the number of incentivised cooperators by a fraction αβpδ . Thus if we force
every cooperator to monitor then self-interested agents will neither cooperate
or monitor if αβ < pδ. To promote cooperation in this kind of environment
we should not, therefore, promote a policy in which every agent should both
cooperate and monitor. This is in contrast to the findings of models of “peer
punishment”, where each agent makes a unilateral decision about whether or
not to monitor and punish other agents and pays a unilateral cost for doing
so. In these models, monitoring and punishment are promoted if cooperation
and monitoring are linked traits, such that agents copy them as a pair (Boyd
& Richerson, 1992; Lehmann et al., 2007). Thus, changing from unilateral to
collective decision-making about how much to invest into monitoring changes
whether or not we should try to force all agents to monitor, or only a subset.
We can now ask, what is the minimum value of β necessary to make full





When this inequality holds, and the agents are all cooperating, then a sufficient
level of monitoring is incentivised to maintain full cooperation. This allows us to
answer the important practical question: how much of their resources should a
group invest into monitoring? The proportion of their common-pool resources,
β, that they should invest in order to maintain cooperation is the smallest value
that satisfies (14). Investing any more than this is wasteful. This highlights
how value-based models can produce precise predictions about how to control
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a system.
So far our analysis has focussed on the conditions under which full coop-
eration will be an equilibrium. However, a separate question is under what
conditions a group of agents will reach this equilibrium if they start out with
no cooperation and no monitoring. We first ask what frequency of monitoring
is necessary to incentivise cooperation when there are no cooperators in the
group? From the previous results this is given by (6), which is independent of
the frequency of cooperators. We then need to ask if this level of monitoring
is incentivised when there are no cooperators in the population. Monitoring
is incentivised when condition (11) is met. We can immediately see that this
cannot be satisfied when nCn = 0, i.e. when no agents are currently cooperating.
Consequently, there is also an equilibrium in which no agent monitors and no
agent cooperates (6 and 11).
This equilibrium in which no agent cooperates or monitors represents a nat-
ural starting point when considering the origin of institutions. How, then, might
a group break free from this equilibrium and move to the cooperate and monitor
equilibrium that increases social welfare? Moving away from this equilibrium
will initially require some agents to monitor for free, i.e. to discount the cost of
monitoring in their utility functions. The critical fraction of monitors to select
for an increase in cooperation is CCps (as per (6)). Therefore, initially at least
this proportion of agents needs to start monitoring while ignoring the costs.
Then, as some agents start to cooperate, the cost of monitoring will start to be
repaid. For a given non-zero frequency of cooperators, a greater frequency of
monitoring costs will be repaid when the proportion of CPR used for monitoring
(β) is greater. This suggests that in order to reduce the amount of “charity”
that monitors must initially perform, a group should initially set its β to a large
value. This can then be reduced down to that given by (14) once full cooper-
ation is reached (see also Chen, Sasaki, Brännström & Dieckmann, 2015 for a
similar argument concerning switching from rewards to punishments in order to
incentive cooperation more efficiently once cooperation becomes common).
The frequency of cooperation required to fully pay for monitoring is given by
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s . When this is less than 1 then there will be excess
funds available at the full cooperation equilibrium that can be used to reimburse
agents that initially suffered a cost for their monitoring, such that they do not
pay a net lifetime cost even if they initially perform monitoring for free. This
effect could likely be captured to some extent in a value-based model using
strategies that make a commitment (Han, Pereira & Lenaerts, 2017), or that
incorporate reinforcement learning of payoffs from imagined actions (Dridi &
Lehmann, 2014). However, because we are describing a behaviour that requires
agents to be forward-looking to some degree, it cannot be fully captured in
an evolutionary game theory model where individuals’ cognition is completely
myopic. It could, however, be explored easily in an executable content-based
model that implements cognitive theories of agent behaviour.
6. Recommendations
In this section, we offer some recommendations arising from this study, aimed
at those using modelling approaches to understand, control and design social
and socio-technical systems.
6.1. Recommendation 1: Use both content-based and value-based approaches
In this study, we have shown that existing results, found in the literature,
and obtained from ABM techniques, can be complemented with those obtained
by taking an EGT approach. The results in Section 5 would have been difficult
to obtain empirically. However, the EGT approach would also struggle to obtain
results concerning the interactions of more complex cognitive agent behaviours,
such as those associated with richer human social interactions. Therefore, in
order to benefit from the complementarity that each provides, our first recom-
mendation is to use both content-based and value-based modelling approaches
to build understanding of a social or socio-technical system.
The risk associated with not doing this is that it is easy otherwise for the re-
sulting understanding to be limited by the assumptions present in one modelling
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form. By taking only a content-based approach, it is unlikely that the modeller
will arrive at statements concerning the utility of a particular behaviour in a
particular context, even though these might in some cases be quite obvious, once
considered. Conversely, taking a purely value-based approach may discourage
consideration of the effect of interacting cognitive agents. As an example of the
latter, Ostrom’s work highlights that, while the Tragedy of the Commons is a
perfectly valid result given the assumed game rules and behaviour model, hu-
mans in practice are able to reflect on this situation, and put measures in place
to change the rules of the game. Such a solution does not naturally arise within,
say, a purely game theoretic framing of the problem. However, by viewing the
problem from multiple theoretical standpoints, assumptions become more ap-
parent and therefore open to challenge.
6.2. Recommendation 2: Don’t worry if the value-based model is not complete
It is tempting to think that, unless one has a complete value-based model of
the system, any model that has been produced would have limited value. While
it is true that we can obtain more complete results from more complete models,
even partial value-based models can expose inequalities that provide valuable
insight.
For example, a more complete analysis of the common-pool resource alloca-
tion problem studied in this article would consider selection on both cooperation
and monitoring at the same time, and arrive at statements accounting for the
co-variance between them. However, even without doing this, we have been
able to arrive at useful analytical results that provide insight beyond what was
readily obtainable using agent-based methods.
6.3. Recommendation 3: Go for the qualitatively equivalent, but more tractable
alternative
Often seemingly innocuous changes to a model can drastically change the
tractability of value-based models. An example is provided by the assumption
here that each monitor perfectly coordinates to monitor a non-overlapping set
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of agents, i.e. that sampling from the pool of agents to be monitored is without
replacement. An alternative would be to assume that this sampling is with
replacement, so that different monitors may end up monitoring the same agent
in the same round, because their monitoring actions are uncoordinated. This
then means that the proportion of agents monitored does not increase linearly
with the number of monitors, but instead increasing the number of monitors
produces diminishing marginal returns in terms of the proportion of agents
covered.
This assumption would be operationalised in the model by changing Equa-
tion 3 to CF(t) = [1−(1− pn )nM(t)]s. This would leave our results concerning the
number of agents that are incentivised to monitor (inequality 11) unchanged.
However, it would change the level of monitoring that is necessary to incen-
tivise cooperation (inequality 6). But presenting this revised inequality in an
intuitive form in terms of nMn is now much more difficult. Consequently, it is
much harder to gain insight into how cooperation is likely to change with in-
vestment into monitoring, and harder to gain insight into the conditions under
which cooperation and monitoring can become established in a group.
In reality, groups are likely to lie somewhere on a continuum between per-
fectly coordinated monitoring and completely uncoordinated monitoring, with
their position depending on the monitoring technology available to them. This
suggests that assuming perfectly coordinated monitoring, as in Equation 3, is
as reasonable as assuming completely uncoordinated monitoring, but has the
crucial advantage of providing intuitive insight. More generally, it is often pos-
sible to tweak model assumptions such that the qualitative insight of the model
is still valid, but the analysis is both more tractable and more intuitive.
7. Discussion
In this article we have demonstrated and explored the complementarity
of ABM and EGT modelling approaches for social and socio-technical sys-
tems, which we characterised as instances of content-based and value-based
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approaches, respectively. We have shown that each approach brings with it
different assumptions, and also offers the potential for different insights, and
hence both provide value.
7.1. Implications for enduring institutions
Our results suggest that how agents decide on the amount that their group
should invest into monitoring is critical to whether or not a sufficient investment
to promote cooperation will be achieved. If each agent makes a completely
unilateral decision about the amount of its resources to invest, then the model
predicts that agents are unlikely to produce a sufficient investment. This accords
with the findings of peer-punishment (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Lehmann et al.,
2007) and pool-punishment (Perc, 2012; Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011) models
from evolutionary biology. Various suggestions have been made to overcome this
problem, including punishment of individuals that do not invest into monitoring
(i.e. second-order punishment Axelrod, 1986; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Perc,
2012), signalling an intention to punish beforehand (Boyd, Gintis & Bowles,
2010), and the proposition that agents do conformity-biased social learning and
so will tend to imitate behaviour to invest into monitoring when the majority
of other agents are already investing (Boyd et al., 2003).
There is likely to be some element of conformity bias in human groups
(but see also Binmore, 2005; Burton-Chellew, Mouden & West, 2017; Burton-
Chellew, Nax & West, 2015; Lamba, 2014; Lamba & Mace, 2011 for critiques of
experiments that argue for conformity in collective action situations). However,
field studies suggest that real collective-action problems tend to be solved by
the creation of institutional rules that promote cooperation and monitoring (Os-
trom, 1990). These often involve groups making a collective decision to invest a
share of their common-pool resources to either hire monitors, or to incentivise
group members themselves to act as monitors. Where this occurs, then our
micro-level model demonstrates that sufficient monitoring can be incentivised
(Variant 2), in contrast to the case where the decision is unilateral (Variant 1).
By explicitly modelling incentivisation using EGT, we can make a precise
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prediction about the proportion of its resources that a group should invest into
monitoring (relation 14). Furthermore, the model suggests that a group should
invest more into monitoring when an institution is trying to become established
from an initial state with little cooperation. Finally, the model predicts that
cooperation will not become established unless some agents initially monitor
“for free”, i.e. discount the cost of monitoring in their utility function. Then, as
cooperation starts to become established more and more of this monitoring will
become incentivised. Moreover, we showed conditions under which when agents
are at the full cooperation equilibrium then there is sufficient investment into
monitoring not only to pay for monitoring at that time, but to reimburse agents
that initially monitored for free, such that they do not pay a lifetime cost for
this.
7.2. Implications for modelling social and socio-technical systems
Figure 1 illustrated that, even within the family of value-based approaches,
there are a variety of alternatives available, and the potential for others to be
developed. Exploring these, and characterising the assumptions between classic
game theory and evolutionary game theory, we can see two ends of a possible
spectrum where different levels of (bounded) rationality are captured. Game
theory, in its various forms, provides a natural way to examine issues related
to the incentivisation of behaviour. It has proven to be useful across both the
natural and social sciences, from biology through to anthropology, sociology,
economics and computer science. A key point is what the various types of game
theory assume about the cognition of agents.
On the one hand, classic game theory assumes that agents are both ratio-
nal and fully forward-looking, being able to work out the consequences of their
actions for an infinite number of rounds in the future. It is recognised that
neither human nor artificial agents have the computational power or sufficient
information about the consequences of their actions to do this. Consequently,
this assumption has been relaxed to some extent with models of bounded ra-
tionality (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). On the other hand, EGT assumes that
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agents are completely myopic, only caring about their payoff in that “generation”
(Maynard Smith, 1982). For this reason, EGT is often seen as a safe minimal
assumption to make about the cognition of agents. Most formal models of
cultural evolution theory also rest on this assumption of myopia and extremely
limited cognition, which they operationalise by using equations from population
genetics to model the spread of cultural traits by imitation (Boyd & Richerson,
1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). Put bluntly, humans are assumed to
copy others because they are unable to attempt to calculate what they should
do, or it is too costly for them to do so (Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
Our model suggests that an assumption of complete myopia is problematic
for explaining the origin of cooperation-promoting institutions. Our results
imply that some agents initially need to take on a monitoring role while ignoring
the immediate costs, since this will lead to an equilibrium where these costs can
be more than repaid. But if individuals are completely myopic, monitoring will
not get off the ground unless we assume forces exogenous to the model such as
“stochastic shocks” that induce a proportion of agents to simultaneously start
cooperating (Foster & Young, 1990), or large numbers of cooperating agents
arriving from other groups (Boyd et al., 2003). While both of these forces
can theoretically produce the result where agents reach the full cooperation
equilibrium, they do not correspond particularly well to human behaviour in
many common-pool resource situations in the field (Ostrom, 1990). Rather,
they are a way of forcing equilibrium shifts into a myopic model.
This suggests that a more natural way to model the origin of cooperation-
promoting institutions is needed, for example by using content-based models as
a complement. Content-based models allow us to capture different theories of
cognition in the agent’s architecture and examine the result of interactions be-
tween agents based on those theories. For example, BDI (Rao & Georgeff, 1995),
HCogAff (Sloman, 2001), ACT-R (Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere
& Qin, 2004), SOAR (Laird, 2012), or the range of agent architectures discussed
by Russell & Norvig (2010), are all viable approaches to capture bounded rea-
soning processes as well as, in some cases, human emotions and other qualitative
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states and values such as trust, fairness and justice (Pitt, 2016).
In the short term, however, we believe that it is important for modellers
to provide clarity concerning whether their models either assume or explore the
extent to which agents engage in cognition, or if they assume that agents simply
‘behave’. This is important, because model predictions may vary drastically as
a result, and thus it provides the context for any resulting insight.
Finally, another line of research would be to consider whether EGT, or other
value-based approaches, can be extended to capture more complex agent be-
haviour, where the value of a behaviour is not readily obtainable in general.
One idea could be to induce the value of behaviours empirically, perhaps as a
second layer in a content-based model. How, for example, might the assump-
tion of bounded rationality be parametrised in order to capture varying levels of
agents’ capacities for knowledge gathering and reasoning, with this being linked
to the value (e.g., fitness) of carrying out such cognitive behaviour? An archi-
tectural schema or styles perspective (Lewis, Platzner, Rinner, Tørresen & Yao,
2016; Russell & Norvig, 2010; Sloman, 2001) provides one way to explore this
space, and combining this with the evolution of traits may provide a way of ex-
ploring the extent to which agents faced with a social dilemma can be expected
to engage in cognitive behaviour to reason through their situation.
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